253J Aristotle, and Peter Tartaretus (14??-1495) $18,000
-
Expositio magistri Petri Tatereti in Summulas Petri Hyspani cum textu, una cum additionibus in locis propriis summa accuratione, summaque animadversione impressa..
With
-
Clarissima singularisq[ue] totius philosophie necnon methaphisice Aristotelis magistri Petri Tatareti expositio.
With
-
Expositio magistri Petri Tatereti super textu logices Aristotelis
Ad1) [Lugduni] : [Claudii davost al’s de troys.], 8. August 1509 (Date in the colophon:
octaua mensis Augusti anno … M.ccccc.ix.)
Ad2) [Lyons] : Impressum cura & industria Claudij davost al[ia]s de troys, 13 July 1509
Ad 3) Imprints suggested by ISTC [Lyons: Claude Davost, after 1500] or [Nicolaus Wolf ? about 1500] or [n.pr., about 1495].
This is a Very Large Octavo 9 x 5 inches. Ad1) a-l8 m10. Ad 2) A-I8, K10, L4, M-T8 Ad3) aa-pp8 qq8
This copy is bound in its original full calf over wooden boards, as you can se above, much of the leather has been lost exposing all the structural features of the construction of the book. It is lacking clasps but retains the catches and remnants of the attachment points of the clasps.
Woodcut initials and quite a few schematic text woodcuts. Spaces and guide letters for large initials not filled in and individual marginalia by old hand. This copy is bound in its original full blind stamped calf over wooden boards. With the old ownership notes (including “Samuel Hoffmanns”, the other deleted) verso with contemporary note. Occasionally contemporary marginalia in red and black ink. With the clasps renewed.
This is a rare incunabula edition of the commentary on Aristotle’s Logic by Petrus Tartaretus, follower of Duns Scotus and rector of theUniversity of Paris in 1490. Here is a Memory device for Aristotle in this book.
The most remarkable Scotist of his time, author of commentaries on the Physics and Ethics of Aristotle, on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and on the Quodlibeta of Duns Scotus.
Most of the bibliographers ascribe the printing of this work to the Lyonese printer Nicolaus Wolff,
classified as quarto volume, the dating ranges between 1495 and around or shortly after 1500.
Ad 1) Panzer, VII,; p. 292, no. 141 Not in Adams or the BM STC, French Books..
Ad 2) USTC no.: 155038 Panzer, VII,; p. 292, no. 140
LIBRARY COPIES: Universitat de Barcelona , Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Oxford (UK), Wadham College Library : Not in Adams or the BM STC, French Books..
Ad 3) Goff T43 = T40; R 758; Pell Ms 10941; IGI V p.153; IBE Post-incunables 249; Sajó-Soltész p.952; Olivar 391; Sack(Freiburg) 3337a; Walsh 3835a; ISTC it00043000
Now Back to a beginning !
Ad1) Aristotle ,Petrus Hispanus,Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanicus Portugalensis)
This work, the first bound in this sammelband is Peter Tartareus’ explanation and direction of Peter Of Spains , Tractatus or Summaries, Tartareus’ follows the structure of Peter of Spain who naturally follows “Porphry’s Tree”
“For nearly four centuries, when logic was the heart of what we now call the “undergraduate curriculum,” Peter of Spain’s Summaries of Logic (c. 1230) was the basis for teaching that subject. Because Peter’s students were teenagers, he wrote simply and organized his book carefully. Since no book about logic was read by more people until the twentieth century, the Summaries has extensively and profoundly influenced the distinctly Western way of speaking formally and writing formal prose by constructing well-formed sentences, making valid arguments, and refuting and defending arguments in debate. ” (quoted from Peter of Spain: Summaries of Logic: Text, Translation, Introduction, and Notes 1st Edition by
“It is still not possible to establish the date of origin of the Tractatus,( and their Summaries) the work that has enjoyed such enormous success. Recent scholarship
suggests that it could have been written any time between the 1220s and the 1250s (Ebbessen 2013, 68–69). It has universally been recognised as a work by Peter of Spain. Another work that has been identified as Peter of Spain’s is aSyncategoreumata (Treatise on Syncategorematic Words), which was probably written some years after the Tractatus.[2] Considering the fact that in all the thirteenth-century manuscripts the Syncategoreumata directly follow the Tractatus, and the number of similarities between doctrinal aspects of these two works on logic, it is almost certain that they were written by the same author. Both works seem to have originated from Southern France or Northern Spain, the region where we also find the earliest commentaries on these treatises.”
The Tractatus
The Tractatus can be divided into two main parts. One part deals with doctrines found in
the so-called logica antiquorum—i.e., the logica vetus (old logic) and logica nova (new logic)—and the other contains doctrines covered by the logica modernorum—viz. the tracts that discuss theproprietates terminorum (properties of terms).
The first main part of the Tractatus divides into five tracts. The first tract, De introductionibus(On introductory topics) explains the concepts used in traditional logic—nomen (noun), verbum(verb), oratio (phrase), propositio (proposition)—and presents the divisions of and the (logical) relationships between propositions. The second tract, De predicabilibus (On the predicables) covers matters dealt with in Boethius’s accounts of Porphyry’s Isagoge. It gives an account of the concept predicabile and the five predicables—genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens—i.e., the common features of and differences between the predicables, as well as of the terms ’predicatio’ and ’denominativum’. Tract three, De predicamentis (On the categories), discusses the ten Aristotelian categories, as well as some items already dealt with in the previous treatise. The fourth tract, De sillogismis (On syllogisms) mainly goes back to Boethius’s De 
syllogismis categoricis (On categorical syllogisms). It gives an explanation of the basic element of the syllogism, i.e., propositio, and of the syllogism, and then goes into mood and figure, the proper forms of syllogisms, and briefly deals with what are called paralogisms. The fifth tract, De locis(On topical relationships), is derived from Boethius’s De topicis differentiis (On different topical relationships) I and II. This tract starts off with an explanation of the notions argumentum and argumentatio, and then proceeds to deal with the species of argumentation: syllogism, induction, enthymeme, and example. Next, it gives a definition of locus (the Latin translation of the Greek topos): a locus is the seat of an argument (i.e., the locus is supposed to warrant the inference by bringing it under some generic rule.) The intrinsic loci (= the kind of locus that occurs when the argument is derived from the substance of the thing involved) are covered first, followed by the extrinsic loci (= the kind of locus that occurs when the argument is derived from something that is completely separate from the substance of the thing involved) and intermediary loci (= the kind of locus that occurs when the argument is taken from the things that partly share in the terms of the problem and partly differ from it). Examples are: intrinsic—the locus “from definition”: ‘a rational animal is running; therefore a man is running’; extrinsic—the locus “from opposites”: ‘Socrates is black; therefore he is not white’; intermediary—‘the just is good; therefore justice is good’.
The second part of the Tractatus comprises subjects that were of major importance in the doctrine of the properties of terms. In the sixth tract, De suppositionibus, the theory of supposition is dealt with. The treatise begins with an exposition of significatio. The definition of significatio runs: significatio is the respresentation of a thing by means of a word in accordance with convention. Next it gives a definition of the related terms suppositio and copulatio, and the differences between the terms significatio, suppositio and copulatio. Of these three suppositioand significatio are the most important in Peter’s semantics. Suppositio is defined as the acceptance of a substantive verb for some thing. Suppositio is dependent on significatio, because supposition can only occur via a term that already has some significatio. Put in other words,significatio pertains to a word by itself, and supposition to a term as actually used in some context.
The tract concludes with a division of suppositio. The first division is into suppositio communis(common supposition) and suppositio discreta (discrete supposition)—e.g., the terms homo(man) and Sortes (Socrates) respectively.
The second division, suppositio communis, is divided into naturalis (natural) and accidentalis(coincidental). Suppositio naturalis is described as the acceptance of a common term for all those things that can share in the common universal nature signified by the term in question—e.g., homo (‘man’) taken by itself by its very nature is able to stand for all men, whether in the past, present or future; suppositio accidentalis is the acceptance of a common term for those things for which the term in question requires an additional term—e.g., in homo est (‘A man is’) the term homo stands for present men, whereas in homo fuit (‘A man has been’) and in homo erit (‘A man will be’) it stands for past men and future men respectively, owing to the additional terms fuit and erit.
The third division, suppositio accidentalis, is divided into suppositio simplex (simple supposition) and suppositio personalis (personal supposition). Suppositio simplex is the acceptance of a term for the universal ‘thing’ it signifies, as in homo est species (‘Man is a species’, animal est genus (‘Animal is a genus’), in which the substantive terms homo and animal stand for the universal man and animal, and not any one of their particulars. Suppositio simplex can occur both in the subject- and in the predicate-term—e.g., homo est species (‘Man is a species’) and omnis homo est animal (‘Every man is an animal’) respectively. Suppositio personalis is the acceptance of a common term for one or more of its particulars, as in homo currit (‘A man is running’).
The fourth division, suppositio personalis, is subdivided into either derterminata (determinate = standing for a certain particular) or confusa (confused = standing for any 
individual falling under that name). Suppositio determinata occurs when a common term is taken indefinitely or in combination with a particular sign—e.g., homo currit (‘Man is running’) or aliquis homo currit(‘A /some man is running’). Suppositio confusa occurs when a common term is taken in combination with a universal sign (’Every man is running’).
The tract on supposition winds up with the discussion of a few questions regarding the attribution of supposition in a few cases.
The seventh tract of the Tractatus, on fallacies, which forms part of the Aristotelian-Boethian logic, is written in the tradition of the Fallacie maiores (Major fallacies). The eighth tract, De relativis (On relatives) deals with the relative pronouns as defined by Priscian in his Institutiones grammaticae. The relative pronouns are devided into: relatives of substance, such as qui (who), ille (he), alius (another), and relatives of accident, such as talis (of such a kind), qualis (of what kind), tantus (so much), quantus (how much). The former are subdivided into relatives of identity (qui and ille) and relatives of diversity (such as alter and reliquus, both of which can be translated as ‘the other’). The relative of identity is defined in terms of supposition as what refers to and stands for the same thing. These relatives are either reciprocal or non-reciprocal. With regard to the relatives of identity, Peter adds a dicussion of a number of questions about the rationale for using demonstrative pronouns, and some problems concerning how the fallacy of a relative having two diverse referents comes about.
The tract on relatives continues with a brief discussion on the relatives of diversity, accompanied by a rule about the supposition of the relative when it is added to a superior and an inferior in a premiss and a conclusion, as in aliud ab animali; ergo aliud ab homine (‘Something other than an animal; therefore something other than a man’). 
With regard to relatives of identity a rule of the “ancients”, who deny that a proposition introduced by a relative can have a contradictory opposite, is discussed and rejected. Another rule is given about the identity of supposition of a non-reciprocal relative and what it refers to. The tract concludes with short accounts of relatives of accident.
The ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth tracts of the Tractatus, i.e., the short tracts De ampliationibus (On ampliation), De appellationibus (On appellation), De restrictionibus (On restriction) and De distributionibus (On distribution) are in fact elaborations of the theory of supposition. Ampliation is an extension of the supposition of a term. It occurs when an expression is combined with a modal term—e.g. homo potest esse Antichristus (‘A man can be the Antichrist’), and homo necessario est animal (‘A man is necessarily an animal’)—in which case the supposition of the term ‘man’ is extended to more than just individuals existing in the present. The tract on appellationes is very short: appellation is considered no more than a special case of restriction, i.e., the restricted supposition brought about by a present-tense verb. In this tract the rules of appellation are in fact specific kinds of rules of restriction. The subject of restriction in general is discussed in the eleventh tract. The rules of restriction are the same ones as were presented in the early Parisian textbooks on logic (see de Libera 1982, pp. 176–177). The final tract, on distribution, deals with the multiplication of common terms as a result of their being combined with universal signs. These universal signs are either distributive of substance (such as omnis, nullus), or of accidents (such as qualiscumque, quantuscumque). In this description ‘substance’ is defined as substistent modes of being, and ‘accident’ as accidental modes of being. Separate attention is given to the universal sign omnis (‘all’ or ‘every’) along with a discussion of the common rule that the use of omnis requires three appellata (particular things). The most frequently cited example in these discussions in the thirteenth century was the sophisma omnis phenix est (‘Every phoenix is’). According to Peter of Spain, the use of omnisdoes not call for at least three appellata; an exception to this rule is found in cases in which there is only one appellatum, as is the phoenix-case. The tract also pays attention to a number of tongue-twisting sophisma-sentences.
Author and Citation Information for “Peter of Spain”
The latest version of the entry “Peter of Spain” may be cited via the earliest archive in which this version appears: Spruyt, Joke, “Peter of Spain”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/peter-spain/> .The citation above refers to the version in the following archive edition:
Peter Tartaretus (14??-1495)
PETRUS TARTARETUS (1494),Known for the concept of Pons asinorum (asses’ bridge ). Although of earlier origin, in philosophy this term was applied to the diagram that Peter Tartaretus constructed to assist the student of logic in the discovery of the middle term of a syllogism. The expression suggests that getting students of logic to find the middle term of a syllogism was as difficult as getting asses to cross a bridge. He is also known as the most remarkable Scotist of his time, *Peter Tartaretus (Tataretus) one of the most eminent of the later Scotists, taught at Paris 1490. Edited commentaries on Aristotle 1494, Expositio in Summulas Petri Hispani, first ed. without date, then 1501 and 1503, commentary on Scotus Quodlibetica 1519, and on Scotus’ commentary on the Sentences 1520. “Wetzer und Weltes: Kirchenlexicon, s. v.”
Ad 2) Petrus Tartaretus commentary of the entirety of Aristotle.
Tartaretus, begins this book by reminding us that he will be following Duns Scotus or as he says “doctoris subtilis” And dives in to The Phisicorum of Aristotle, followed by De Celo & Mundo, De Generatione & coruptione, Metheororum with some very interesting diagrams,De anima, De Sensu & Sensato, De Memoria, and finally Methaphisice.
Ad 3) Peter Tartaretus (14??-1495) on the Logic of Aristotle . Here Tartaretus comments on Aristotles Organon.
“In fact, the title Organon reflects a much later controversy about whether logic is a part of philosophy (as the Stoics maintained) or merely a tool used by philosophy (as the later Peripatetics thought); calling the logical works “The Instrument” is a way of taking sides on this point. Aristotle himself never uses this term, nor does he give much indication that these particular treatises form some kind of group, though there are frequent cross-references between the Topics and the Analytics. On the other hand, Aristotle treats the Prior and Posterior Analyticsas one work, and On Sophistical Refutations is a final section, or an appendix, to the Topics). To these works should be added the Rhetoric, which explicitly declares its reliance on the Topics.”
Quoted from The latest version of the entry “Aristotle’s Logic” may be cited via the earliest archive in which this version appears: Smith, Robin, “Aristotle’s Logic”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/aristotle-logic/>.
C.H. Lohr, ‘Latin Aristotle Commentaries, I, Medieval Authors’, Traditio, XXIII, 1967
Parsons, T.: The traditional square of opposition. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos- ophy. CSLI (2006)
Khomskii, Y.: William of Sherwood, singular propositions and the hexagon of opposition. In: Be ́ziau, J.Y., Payette, G. (eds.) The Square of Opposition. A General Framework for Cognition, pp. 43–60. Peter Lang (2012)
Read, S.: John Buridan’s theory of consequence and his octagons of opposition. In: Be ́ziau, J.Y., Jacquette, D. (eds.) Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition, pp. 93–110. Springer (2012)
Leave a Reply